[URBANTH-L]
REV: Rosenfeld on Taraki ed., Living Palestine: Family Survival,
Resistance and Mobility under Occupation
Angela Jancius
jancius at ohio.edu
Fri May 30 10:41:04 EDT 2008
[forwarded from H-Levant at h-net.msu.edu]
Lisa Taraki, ed. Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance and Mobility
under Occupation. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006. xxx + 296 pp.
Notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8156-3107-1.
Reviewed by: Maya Rosenfeld, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Published by: H-Levant (April, 2008)
Palestinian Social Research and the Ongoing Crisis in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories
This volume is a timely addition to the disturbingly slender body of
academic research on Palestinian society during the current, ultra-violent
phase of the Israeli military occupation. One may have assumed that the
October 2000 disruption of the Palestinian attempt--short-lived and
circumscribed as it was--at state-building, and the unprecedented upsurge of
Israeli military aggression that followed thereafter, which carried in its
wake devastation and destruction for all aspects of Palestinian social,
economic, and political life in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, would have
given rise to a large body of "crisis and disaster focused" social research
and literature. Such an expectation was all the more apt if one took into
consideration the wealth of social, political, and historical research that
was triggered by the first Intifada (1987-93) and the diversity of scholars,
in terms of both disciplinary specialization and nationality, who took part
at that time in the enterprise of in-depth inquiry and knowledge production.
But the more than seven years that have elapsed since the outbreak of the
second Intifada (and Israel's first attempts to suppress it) in October 2000
appear to have yielded a very different scholarly reaction.
Certainly, one is overwhelmed by the volume, high quality, and
comprehensiveness of crisis and catastrophe-centered research that has been
(and is continuously being) carried out and published by a host of
international and local organizations and agencies. These include a dozen or
so UN organizations, first and foremost the Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the World Bank, the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (an agency of the
Palestinian Authority), a long list of international and Palestinian NGOs,
and a number of Palestinian, Israeli, and international human rights
organizations. Indeed, the abundance of data on poverty, declining standards
of living, unemployment, labor market contraction, and other crises in the
public and private sectors that is found in the periodical and annual
reports by the aforementioned organizations is probably sufficient to
sustain hundreds of research projects in the social sciences. However, it is
a distressing fact that the incorporation of this raw data and its partially
processed findings into broader sociological, anthropological, and
historical studies is lagging far behind.
Living Palestine, a collection of research essays that explore relatively
recent trends in urban culture, marriage patterns, emigration and class
formation, the organization of and changing relationships within family
households, and women's economic participation in contemporary occupied
Palestine is therefore a welcome contribution, if only for its capacity to
supplement "facts and figures" with sociohistorical analysis. All six
contributors to this volume, five female and one male, are West Bank-based
Palestinian academics practicing various social science disciplines,
including sociology (Jamil Hilal, Lisa Taraki, Eileen Kuttab), public health
(Rita Giacaman), and gender studies (Lamis Abu Nahleh, Penny Johnson).
Furthermore, all have previously written extensively on Palestinian society
and politics in the Occupied Territories, some for nearly three decades. The
five women contributors are all affiliated with Birzeit University, three
with the Institute of Women's Studies (IWS), one with the Institute of
Community and Public Health, and one with the Department of Sociology. The
sixth contributor is a research fellow at the Palestinian Institute for the
Study of Democracy in Ramallah, who has also worked in collaboration with
Birzeit's IWS.
In addition to the authors' shared institutional affiliation, another
connecting link renders Living Palestine into a joint venture, rather than a
mere collection of topically related articles. All of this volume's
contributors relied heavily on the findings of a survey of two thousand
Palestinian households in nineteen communities in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip designed by the Institute of Women's Studies at Birzeit University and
conducted in the summer of 1999. The authors also made use of various
publications of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS),
primarily statistical data compiled from the 1997 census and from annual
surveys conducted from 1995 to 2000. Only two research essays relied
extensively on fieldwork and relevant statistical data from more recent
crises, that is, since 2001. This implies that, somewhat contrary to the
initial impression its contents convey, this collection elaborates more upon
developments of the 1990s than upon those of the post-Oslo years, a point to
which I will return. In what follows I offer a critical reading of two
essays in the collection: Lisa Taraki and Rita Giacaman's "Modernity Aborted
and Reborn: Ways of Being Urban in Palestine," and "Living Together in a
Nation of Fragments: Dynamics of Kin, Place and Nation" by Penny Johnson.
Taking as their starting point "the abrupt abortion [in 1948] of Palestine's
urban modernity as embodied in the coastal cities of Jaffa and Haifa and in
the inland city of Jerusalem" (p. 1), Lisa Taraki and Rita Giacaman set out
to explore prototypes of urban history and of contemporary urban life in the
West Bank, where the continuity, rather than the rupture, of communities
prevailed. The authors' choice to focus on the cities of Nablus, Hebron, and
Ramallah reflects an attempt on their part to encompass the marked diversity
of urban development within this small part of historical Palestine.
However, due to the relative scarcity of existing sociohistorical research
on the three cities and the paucity of primary sources available to the
authors, the reconstructed "city profiles" that emerge, while instructive,
are based on considerable speculation and border on stereotypes. Thus Hebron
and Ramallah are depicted as polar opposites, antipodes on the continuum of
modernity and development. Hebron, the service and commercial center for
Jabal al-Khalil, which retained attributes of a semi-rural town throughout
the twentieth century, is characterized as the stronghold of traditionalism,
conservatisms, localism, and narrow-mindedness. In contrast, Ramallah,
currently the political and administrative "capital" of the Palestinian
National Authority, is essentialized as the cosmopolitan home of students,
intellectuals, and professionals, as well as local and international NGOs.
And finally, Nablus, which has historically served as the region's economic
and cultural capital, and is home to a distinctive urban (yet "traditional")
elite that has long played a significant role in the Palestinian national
movement, is afforded an intermediate position in the aforementioned
hierarchy. Conspicuously absent from this typology, however, is an attempt
to incorporate the impact of four decades of Israeli military occupation and
the equally long period of resistance to that occupation in the framework of
the Palestinian national movement. In other words, the single most
significant factor contributing to occupied Palestine's general economic,
social and institutional underdevelopment, its arrested urban development,
the consequent homogenization of socioeconomic conditions and reshaping of
social structure, and the emergence and consolidation of political
consciousness in this territory, was inexplicably left out of the analysis.
The absence of these key analytical determinants becomes all the more
problematic in the second part of the essay, in which the authors use the
reconstruction of their three historical profiles in an attempt to explain
contemporary demographic and social characteristics of the three cities. To
this end they mobilize a body of statistical data--most of which was
extracted from the PCBS 1997 census--on fertility, marriage, education,
employment, occupational differentiation, patterns of consumption, and other
elements of lifestyle in the three urban areas and their corresponding rural
districts. One salient finding that emerges from the abundance of data
presented here and in other parts of this collection, is that, on the eve of
the twenty-first century, the districts of Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron
exhibited relative similarity in terms of major socio-demographic
indicators. These include an ever increasing rate of female enrollment in
institutions of higher education, a significantly low rate of female
participation in the labor force, a very high rate of kin marriages, a very
low median age of women at the time of their first marriage, and a
correspondingly high fertility rate. Another salient finding is that the
city of Ramallah, at that time (1997) home to less than 20,000 residents,
constituted a marked exception when compared to both its rural hinterland
and to the other two cities. This was especially so in terms of Ramallah's
relatively high concentration of students, adults with post-secondary
education, professionals, persons employed in medium and higher management,
recent emigrants from other parts of Palestine and from the Diaspora, and
households with private cars, computers, and other amenities.
However, rather than tracing the processes that yielded both the exception
(Ramallah) and the rule (all other urban and semi-urban communities in the
West Bank), the authors attribute contemporary socio-demographic disparities
between the cities to distinct, immanent "social universes" (p. 31),
"cultural universes" (p. 33), or "urban paradigms" (p. 40) that allegedly
breed distinct value systems. Thus, the significantly higher percentage of
adults with higher education in Ramallah is attributed to the great
valorization of education by the Ramallawis as well as to their "modernist
dispositions" (p. 48). Conversely, we are told that the slightly higher
rates of child labor in Hebron and Nablus reflect the fact that "in Hebron
and Nablus some sectors within the population appear to believe that their
children can manage their lives without much education" (p. 37), and the
greater prevalence of amenities in Ramallah households is deemed indicative
of the distinctive "life agendas" adopted by particular individuals and/or
families. One cannot escape the feeling that this essay was written as a
song of praise for the Ramallah-based Palestinian middle class and the
supposedly (post?) modernist "ethics" it upholds, a sociopolitical stand in
marked contrast to the radical orientation that characterized Palestinian
social science just two decades ago. However, my main problem is rather with
analysis that reproduces Ramallah, Hebron, and Nablus as self-contained
entities divorced from the political economy of the Israeli occupation as
well as from Palestinian politics. One is tempted to ask if, as is claimed,
Ramallah is a "cultural universe" of its own, how do we explain the results
of the parliamentary (PLC) elections of 2006, which demonstrated the fact
that popular support for Hamas did not stop at the gates of this city? And
what sense do we make of the fact that, for many years, the student movement
at Birzeit University, perhaps "the" symbol of the "Ramallawi spirit," has
been dominated, in whole or in part, by factions affiliated with Islamist
political parties?
Researched and written by Penny Johnson, the second essay in the collection
attempts to explain the persistence and pervasiveness of endogamy (marriage
inside the kinship group, or kin-marriage, as it is termed here) in the
Occupied Territories in the face of the profound social and political
transformations that Palestinian society underwent during its prolonged
subjection to Israeli military occupation. The high incidence and marked
stability of endogamy are revealed in the ample statistical data that
Johnson presents, and which are worth dwelling upon at some length. I will
confine my remarks to the most salient data items: according to the IWS
survey, in 1999 the prevalence of marriage between first cousins--the form
of marriage to which the highest cultural preference is accorded--among
women who had ever been married stood at 21 percent in the northern West
Bank, 26 percent in the central West Bank, 27 percent in the southern West
Bank, 30 percent in the Gaza Strip, and 32 percent in Jerusalem, with the
cross-regional average standing at 27 percent. A PCBS survey taken in 2000
yielded comparable results, and found that an additional 19.3 to 21 percent
of women who had ever been married were in fact married to more distant
relatives (distant cousins from the same hamula). Most importantly, the data
revealed that the prevalence of first cousin marriage bore little relation
to classic indicators like age, urban vs. rural residency, locality, or
educational level (pp. 67-68). Of further interest is the wide gap between
parents' declared preferences with respect to marriage partners for their
children and actual practice. Parents of prospective brides and grooms
commonly express negative views about marriage to relatives, occasionally
employing a "modernist discourse" of genetics for that purpose. Yet, more
often than not, they end up marrying off their daughters and sons to close
or distant cousins.
As Johnson acknowledges, a prevalence of kin marriage is not unique to
Palestinian society. It is, in fact, rather common in all contemporary Arab
societies, with the incidence of first cousin marriage in the 1990s reaching
24 percent in Egypt, 31 percent in Saudi Arabia, 35 percent in Syria, and 43
percent in Libya (p. 66). Moreover, endogamy is, alongside patrilocality,
patrilineality, and patriarchy, among the cultural practices and structural
features that have received the most scholarly attention from
anthropologists, sociologists, and social historians. Scholars have offered
varying explanations for endogamy's historical origins, its social, economic
and cultural "functions," its interaction with other components of the
sociopolitical system, and the reasons for its persistence against a
backdrop of changing socioeconomic conditions. However, there is a broad
scholarly consensus that endogamy is an embodiment of patriarchal control
exercised by older male members of the family (and the broader kinship
group) over young, unmarried family members, particularly unmarried
females.[1] It is because of this linkage that the high incidence of
endogamy is commonly employed as an indicator of social conservatism as well
as of the lower social status of women in a given society. Conversely, the
apparent aim of Johnson's analysis is to free endogamy from its
interconnection with patriarchy, at least as far as the contemporary
practice of kin marriage in occupied Palestine is concerned. Indeed, nowhere
in the text does Johnson note the ways in which endogamy, as a particular
form of family-arranged marriage, enacts and reproduces patriarchal
relationships within the families of the (hundreds of thousands of)
Palestinian women whose experiences are the basis of the data she utilizes.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that Johnson eschews explanatory schemes that
indicate connections between the persistence of endogamy, the preservation
of property relations, the reinforcement of social conservatism, and the
repression of women.
Rather, Johnson selectively employs the theoretical apparatus of Pierre
Bourdieu, particularly his concept of "economies of symbolic goods" and his
conceptualization of kin and family relations as a relatively autonomous
sphere, one not explicitly determined by the economic and political
structures within which it is embedded. Thus armed, she asserts that
"everyday practices of marriage and 'kin work' are sites where Israeli
colonialism is contested and identity is constituted" (p. 52). The main
thrust of Johnson's argument is that marriage between relatives (and
occasionally, between unrelated members of the same community) is a means by
which Palestinian families and the individuals they comprise fulfill
essential social and emotional needs that they have been consistently
denied, first by the Israeli occupation regime, and subsequently by the
failure of the PNA to restore basic services or otherwise alleviate the
devastating consequences of the siege and fragmentation that Israel imposes.
In communities where permanent insecurity reigns, where people's ability to
work and make a living, stay on their land, access health care, and travel
is frequently disrupted or denied altogether, the persistence of endogamy
indicates the importance that people accord to "closeness." In other words,
it is their acknowledgement that, especially during periods of social
instability, the similarity, indeed the "familiarity" or even "sameness"
shared by prospective spouses is deemed a most valuable social asset (pp.
76-77). In short, Johnson interprets "the dynamics of sameness in marriage"
(p. 87) as a means by which parents seek to protect their children and
improve the latter's future prospects, a process yielding enhanced social
solidarity and greater empowerment of the individuals involved.
In the absence of a modern state and the entitlements and services that such
sovereign entities regularly confer, one is likely to find increased
dependence on the family and other kinship ties for security, stability, and
other forms of support. This is doubly true under the conditions wrought by
military occupation. Moreover, a rich and varied body of ethnographic
research conducted in the occupied Palestinian territories, including my own
work and Lamis Abu Nahleh's contribution to this volume, provides us with
analysis of household economies and other "mechanisms" that enable families
to survive prolonged crises like severe, chronic poverty, irregular income
patterns, and the multitude of daily pressures caused by the occupation.[2]
However, along with the crucial support it provides, greater reliance on
family and kinship ties usually entails increased subjection of individuals,
particularly young, unmarried women, to patriarchal control. It is in this
context, I believe, that one should interpret evidence documenting the
persistence of kin marriage in occupied Palestine. Specifically, the fact
that such a significant number of Palestinian parents continue to arrange
their children's marriages is an indication of the low place young,
unmarried men and women occupy in the hierarchies of their families and the
larger society.
In the history of the Palestinian national movement "social agendas" always
lagged far behind the national issue. Nonetheless, until quite recently, the
secular organizations that constituted the national movement in the Occupied
Territories, particularly the leftist organizations and their affiliated
women's committees, considered themselves progressive alternatives to
conservative, reactionary social forces and institutions, including the
patriarchal family. This position found natural expression in the critical
attitude that political activists adopted to kin marriage, an issue to which
I became exposed during my field research in the Dheisheh refugee camp
(between 1992 and 1996). The parents of young male and female activists
often attempted to arrange their children's marriages to first cousins or
more distant relatives. Many resisted such attempts and mobilized
"organizational resources" to that end: senior members of organizations
repeatedly assumed intermediary roles, intervening on behalf of junior
activists in an effort to call off arranged marriages or obtain parents'
approval of their children's marriage choices. Resistance to the occupation
was thus coupled, even if only to a modest degree, with resistance to the
family's patriarchal control over its young members.
The Palestinian political arena has changed profoundly since the early
1990s. Popular political structures have all but evaporated, as has the
power of leftist parties and organizations. Women's political committees
have either been dissolved or supplanted by NGOs, and what remains of the
secular national movement faces fierce competition from Islamist
organizations. Hardly any political formation challenges the traditional
family's authority, while rising religious forces champion traditional
values and institutions. This retrogression is another factor explaining the
persistence and prevalence of kin marriage in the Occupied Territories.
Notes
[1]. Suad Joseph, "Gender and Family in the Arab World," in Arab Women:
Between Defiance and Restraint, ed. Suha Sabbagh (New York: Olive Branch
Press, 1996), 194-202.
[2]. Maya Rosenfeld. Confronting the Occupation: Work, Education and
Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2004).
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